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Health care remains a $300 billion driver of the national
economy. Venture dollars invested in biomedical device and
technologies and biotechnology in 2000 and 2001 were $5.7
billion and $3.5 billion, respectively. Public financing for these
sectors totaled $20 billion and $5 billion, respectively, for the
2 years (Fig 1). Yet the transfer of technologies from academia
to the public continues to follow a twisted path. Universities
are often woefully unconnected to sources of nongovernment
or foundation-derived capital, and the financial community
has done little to facilitate the necessary trust and expertise in
the university setting to smooth the translation of science to
commercially applicable technologies.
By creating the Small Business Innovative Research
(SBIR) program, the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
demonstrated its recognition that commercialization of
scientific projects funded by the federal government is an
objective of the original grants themselves. Yet a knowledge
gap and perhaps innate suspicion exists within academia as
to how best to introduce, protect, commercialize, and
recognize economic rewards from technologies emanating
from its faculties. The gap is cultural—the lack of recogni-
tion that private and public equity financing are as critical to
the realization and dissemination of technology as NIH
grants are to the discovery and nascent development of
technologies—as well as practical (Fig 2). Although most
universities have established offices to facilitate technology
transfers, these offices are often ineffective in building
robust relationships with the few investor groups that are
comfortable mining the hall of academia for promising
science that could be developed with experienced and
appropriate management teams.
New technology diffusion in the life sciences depends
on a variety of essential support structures. The introduc-
tion of a new medical technology begins ideally with inno-
vation that responds to clinical need, progresses through
engineering and scientific development, is fostered by fi-
nancing from a variety of sources, and reaches the markets
through disparate commercial structures. Along the way,
the technology is subject to scientific, clinical, engineering,
and regulatory scrutiny. The technology may be appropri-
ately lost to the target community by demonstration of a
lack of validity, safety, or effectiveness, or unfortunately
derailed by mismanagement of its development.
The method by which new medical technologies are
funded in the period between concept and product launch
is a critical and dynamic part of any technology diffusion
and application. Tied to strategic development, this fund-
ing starts with peer-reviewed or foundation support but
ultimately can take the form of small-business grants from
the government (SBIRs), angel investment, corporate stra-
tegic partnership, venture capital and mezzanine invest-
ment, and, finally, the public markets.
With revolutionary development in the methods by
which vascular disease, and indeed all care, is delivered,
commercial funding of clinical trials and device technology
development has become a ubiquitous presence in commu-
nity and university medical centers, with surgeons serving
as investigators but also as inventors and developers of
many of the technologies in question. To understand and
thus interpret better the process of technology financing,
this review will outline strategies and pitfalls in obtaining
this funding and address the process by which private and
public funding occurs.
STRATEGIC APPROACH TO RAISING CAPITAL
Initial investment in a promising technology often will
come from private sources. “Angel” investors are typically
high net-worth individuals who seek to deploy a portion of
their capital in a high risk/high return vehicle. Although
often sophisticated, the structure of these investments is
less formal than that found with venture capital, which
represents professional deployment of large pools of capital.
The latter investors, regularly accountable to sophisticated
limited partners, are typically far more stringent about
valuation, ie, the purported worth of a company or its
technology, board representation, and ultimately about
control of the company as it is managed to a “liquidity
event” (sale or public offering) for the investors, founders,
and management. The balance between angel investment
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and venture investment can be delicate, as companies ben-
efit strongly from professional involvement at the board
level but will inevitably give up a greater share of the
company in the process if venture rather than angel invest-
ment is sought. Ultimately, more effective management
leads to higher returns, a greater probability of success,
and more effective dissemination of valuable technology,
thus rendering a smaller percentage of ownership more
valuable.
Alternatives and later stages for capital sources include
the public markets, strategic partnerships with large corpo-
rations, which often include milestone payments for
achievements along a path to commercialization and debt
capital. Strategic partnerships can also provide research
revenues and grants designed for business development
which are separated from the potential conflict of interest of
funds designed for use by the founder’s academic labora-
tory. Choosing among these avenues becomes a complex
Fig 1. Financing activity in the health care markets, 2001-2002. Venture financing, black bars; Initial public offerings,
dark gray bars; secondary offerings, light gray bars.
Fig 2. Funding for technology development by stage.
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and critical strategic consideration in the management of a
promising technology.
Any capital raise must be tied to the projected use, the
“use of proceeds.” It is impossible to raise capital without a
clear business plan in mind—namely scientific, clinical, or
commercial milestones to be achieved and the associated
personnel, supplies, regulatory, legal, development, mar-
keting, etc, costs along the way. The best approach for such
companies involves setting an endpoint—a specific level of
liquidity, for instance, or a future financing event—and then
determining the amount of capital necessary to get there.
When deciding on a funding target, ie, an amount to be
raised and the source of the capital, a young company
should try to project its future needs in several categories:
● Operating capital is necessary to cover anticipated day-
to-day and project-specific costs until the next financing
event;
● a cushion of capital, or opportunity capital, is needed to
enable both planned and unforeseen strategic initiatives,
as well as to account for failures or changes in plans over
this same period;
● negotiating capital—this cushion is provided to maintain
a position of financial strength during protracted nego-
tiations with potential strategic partners, which are gen-
erally larger and acutely aware of a young company’s
“burn rate” (monthly or quarterly expenditures); and
● protective capital to provide sufficient protection against
the old adage that anything that can go wrong, will go
wrong—one of the abiding principles in technology-rich
young companies.
All too frequently, private companies underestimate their
needs and raise insufficient funds. This is often because of a
fear of dilution, the reality that raising extra capital at a lower
valuation will result in the original owners, the founders of the
company, or the university that has rights to the patent,
retaining too small a fraction of ownership. For companies
raising capital, less is not more, it is usually less. Dilutive
financings, while seemingly onerous, often provide the fire-
power to develop the technology, secure the intellectual prop-
erty so critical to success, and pay for the management muscle
necessary to withstand competition. Undercapitalization will
threaten the survival of a new company, and frequently leads
to the distracting cycle of a rapid need to raise more capital
rather than allowing management to attend to the aggressive
development of the technology. This translates into less being
accomplished, milestones not being reached, and diminished
valuation during a period of significant vulnerability. At the
very least, it may simply ensure the need for painfully dilutive
financing at a later date. It may also prove to be the death knell
of the company, despite the promise of the technology.
Numerous financing options exist for companies (Fig
3). Companies should think strategically about the best
source of capital for their particular needs. Short-term debt,
such as lines of credit that provide working capital and
enable equipment leasing and similar expenditures, is both
necessary and useful. However, long-term debt often hurts
a young company more than it helps, as it creates a periodic
cost that can cause cash flow problems. Emergency debt
arrangements can be even more perilous, if unavoidable at
the time.
Equity financing, the issuance of stock in exchange for
funding, requires its own balancing act. Angel invest-
ment—raising capital from nonprofessional high net-worth
individuals who have an interest in but not deep expertise in
a particular technology—is often the first path chosen by
young companies or universities that are seeking to spin out
technology. Although “angels” provide capital, there are
dangers in this capital structure that private companies may
rue later in their development. In general, angels are the
least professional investors: they
● invest at valuations not linked to the market,
● often lack industry experience, and
● may make unreasonable demands of management.
The latter occurs especially with regard to valuation or
business direction when the need for professional invest-
ment becomes apparent and appropriate. Financing be-
yond the reach of angel investment becomes necessary
when technology and development milestones such as clin-
ical trials, marketing efforts, and the recruitment of experi-
ence management are approached.
In an ideal world, an investor should offer something of
value other than money—be it the experience of the ven-
ture capitalist, the savvy market read of the hedge fund
manager, the cachet of the crossover investor (one who
invests in both public and private companies and is viewed
as validation for private companies seeking access to public
capital), or the technology validation of the strategic inves-
tor. Angels fall short here as well, as they generally bring
little other than capital to the table and are not viewed by
later-stage investors as proof of the worth of the investment
under consideration. In fact, the presence of angels is often
viewed by professional investors as a negative factor—a sort
of prejudice that may sell short a promising technology at a
critical juncture in its life cycle.
The issuance of common stock for employees and for
angels is fine, but most financial investors (and many stra-
Fig 3. Sources of capital for health care companies.
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tegic ones) demand convertible preferred stock. This en-
sures the investors that in the event of a liquidation of the
company below the target value, the investors have the first
rights to retrieving their money. In a successful exit of a
young company—whether an acquisition by a large consol-
idator or a public offering that brings public money and
liquidity to the investors and employees alike, preferred
stock and common stock are rewarded equally for the most
part; this aspect of a deal structure should not be construed
as onerous to the initial investors or management. Access-
ing venture capital, as discussed later, will almost always
entail the imposition of this term in the deal structure.
In addition to traditional venture capital firms, emerg-
ing growth firms may secure capital from hedge funds,
which are bound by relatively few rules and regulations and
are able to invest in private companies; “crossover” inves-
tors, which are the private equity arms of large fund orga-
nizations; and strategic investors, which are often willing to
invest simply to gain access to technology. There is also
increasing rationale for companies to look across the Atlan-
tic, as changes in the European investment environment
have created significant financing opportunities for U.S.
firms, and American investors have recognized the recent
growth in European entrepreneurial activity.
Non-balance-sheet or “P&L” (profit and loss) capital,
such as that generated by milestone payments or research
revenue, can sometimes provide the kind of recurring rev-
enue stream that an emerging growth company needs.
Such infusions are nondilutive to equity holders, but usu-
ally mean decreased participation in future profits. In ne-
gotiating these partnerships, it is critical to avoid significant
constraints on the company’s ultimate choice of acquisition
or public offering as terms like these can make it difficult to
obtain further financing if it is needed and also can limit the
ultimate exit value of the company to the detriment of all
investors except the strategic partner.
Finally, government funding from the likes of the De-
fense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the
SBIR program, and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) is available to fund research and devel-
opment efforts. Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements (CRADAs), project-specific alliances between
private companies and government agencies, offer another
option. One drawback to raising capital through govern-
ment programs is the attendant reporting requirements,
which can often be Byzantine at best.
During boom times, a private company is often encour-
aged by intermediaries to go public, on the basis of appar-
ent market receptivity. Feasibility alone does not justify the
onus of being a public company, nor does it necessarily
dovetail to a strategically sound reason for accessing public
financing.
Companies should go public when it is both possible
and necessary. There are, generally speaking, four compel-
ling reasons to become public.
● The company needs more capital than can be raised in the
private markets.
● The company needs a public security underlying option
packages to attract senior experienced management.
● The company needs a public security for currency in
making acquisitions to either fuel growth or expand and
protect its intellectual property position.
● The company needs to be public for credibility with its
customers.
In addition, certain threshold criteria should be met.
These criteria will vary by industry, but at the very least a
company on the verge of a public offering should have its
complete infrastructure in place, visible positive events in
the near future, and an expected valuation that will be large
enough to attract institutional investors. (At the moment,
that means a valuation of at least $300 million.)
There is no denying that a “public to private” discount
exists, justified primarily by the relative illiquidity of private
vs public equity. Because private equity investors routinely
apply this discount when valuing prospective investments,
companies may be (somewhat rationally) tempted to favor
the public markets. However, forcing an initial public of-
fering (IPO) before a company is ready is not prudent, as
any short-term valuation gains must be weighed against the
liabilities associated with an under-performing public com-
pany, which resides under the scrutiny of its investors. This
scrutiny relates directly to the important consideration that
for most companies, the IPO is not the last financing event.
Raising equity as a recently public company with a fallen
stock price can be extremely disadvantageous as investors
look to management to provide ongoing proof of ability to
execute on a business plan that is in turn valued by addi-
tional investors competing for and thus driving up the share
price. In short, a premature IPO can cripple future growth
prospects.
The standards for migration of a private company to a
public one can generally be viewed as:
● Compelling technology that will provide either incre-
mental quality gains at reduced costs to medical consum-
ers or that is so revolutionary (a “disruptive” technology)
that adoption is inevitable given the marked improve-
ment in clinical care that will ensue.
● An effective, experienced management team. This can
not be overemphasized. The best technology or most
advantageous clinical improvement can be lost to the
public by virtue of mismanaged trials, unethical behavior,
or mismanagement of the funding process. Although
clinical need and science/technology drive the inventive
process, not recognizing the need for professional man-
agement can be construed as a moral failure in the
inevitability of not delivering much needed technology
to the population at large.
● A clean and strong intellectual property position—lack of
protective elements to prevent rapid competition and
devaluation of the offering will drive investors away
● A significant market opportunity—large unmet clinical
needs and/or an inadequate solution by current thera-
peutic approaches are sought by investors at this time.
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This is not to minimize the importance of smaller niches
within the clinical world; however, differing financing
and development choices rather than venture or public
investment are usually needed for these important enti-
ties.
● A reasonable competitive environment, ie, one in which
an overly powerful competitor, even with a lesser tech-
nology offering, holds too much sway with the decision
makers of the relevant clinical technology purchases.
It takes time to raise money. Any investor of merit will
perform extensive due diligence on the management, prod-
ucts, and market opportunity of a company under consid-
eration for his portfolio. As a result, it can be dangerous for
a private company to underestimate the time required to
close a financing deal. If a firm waits too long to start the
process, its balance sheet can weaken, eroding its negotiat-
ing power. Generally speaking (although subject to market
conditions), a company should never assume it can com-
plete a private financing in less than 12 weeks. Even when
one is accessing the private markets, it is important to
understand the tight linkage between the public and private
capital markets. Waiting too long to raise money exposes
the company unnecessarily to the whimsy of the capital
markets. Further, it is wise to have an additional “buffer
zone” of at least another 12-weeks cash on hand (or
roughly six months cash in total) when initiating fundrais-
ing. Although this is relatively conservative advice, compa-
nies should never underestimate the utility of negotiating
from a position of strength.
Although creativity in business and in science is always
admirable and almost always imperative, creativity in de-
signing capital structure is full of risk and rarely necessary.
Young companies, especially those reliant on products or
processes of technical complexity, should employ simple
capital structures to counterbalance the business risks as-
sumed by investors. Straightforward convertible preferred
stock that surrenders as few added bells and whistles as
possible, is best.
Stated differently, complexity has its costs. A company
with a confusing or contorted capital structure, regardless
of its stage of development, will always be penalized by
investors. This phenomenon can be observed repeatedly
with public companies that have been very creative in
funding their technologies. Historically, the arcane finan-
cial statements of these firms have dragged their shares
below those of their peers. If a private company is forced to
employ unwelcome capital structures, it may be necessary
to clean them up prior to an IPO. Extensive angel invest-
ment, with numerous investors each owning very small
portions of the company, is a classic example of the type of
complex capital structure that appears attractive in the short
run but becomes detrimental during critical phases of a
company’s development
Even if a firm is raising money in the best of times, it is
best to structure its financing positions for the worst of
times. The need for simplicity is even more pressing when
financing in difficult environments. At such times, there are
three proven safeguards that will help a company avoid
dangerous financing terms: (1) a healthy cash balance; (2)
competition among potential investors; and (3) existing
investors with enthusiasm and the ability to follow initial
investments with further financing, both to protect the
investors’ position and to protect the company from pred-
atory financing terms.
Finally, there is a temporal dimension to the design of
capital structure. Although an emerging growth company
should target an optimum capital mix, its capital structure
should be sufficiently elastic to respond to changes in the
firm’s development and shifts in the capital markets. Capital
markets should not alter the ultimate mix of a company’s
sources of capital—only the timing of using those sources.
DILIGENCE PROCESS
Regardless of the origin of the funds, the evaluation of
the potential for commercial success of an idea or a tech-
nology is known as the diligence process. Diligence, in
assessing the benefit of the technology in question, the
market, and, most importantly, the patients, carries certain
overlapping responsibilities and methods. This section will
explore in detail the concerns that must be accounted for in
the development of any new technology from the commer-
cial investment perspective, emphasizing both the strategic
needs and thought process and the ethical responsibilities
of the investors in the process.
The process includes but is not limited to the following:
● technology, products, and capabilities of the developing
technology company;
● scientific due diligence;
● regulatory structure;
● evaluation of current existing therapies;
● manufacturing diligence;
● market dynamics and attractiveness;
● intellectual property;
● management capability, experience, and integrity.
Technology and anticipated products. The credibil-
ity of the inventor, scientist, or the company developing the
technology is often the first barrier for an investor to pass in
evaluating an opportunity. Any technology must serve a
purpose rather than exist as an engineering solution in
search of a market. Misapplication of scientific or engineer-
ing capability leads to either increasing cost in our health-
care system without benefit of improved quality or safety,
or leads to investment failure either financially or ethically
with regard to promotion of an inappropriately supported
technology.
Scientific due diligence. Scrutiny of the available data
about the technology in question will reflect the stage of
development and, therefore, the stage, size, and terms of
investment. Nonetheless, diligence must demonstrate at
least the following as organized by stage of investment.
● Seed stage: begins with a well-defined clinical problem
and need for which current solutions remain imperfect,
and is tied to a cogent scientific solution.
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● Early stage: reduction of the scientific idea to some level
of practical application either through computer model-
ing and prototype production or early animal testing.
● Pre-clinical stage: demonstrated safety and efficacy in
animal models with progression to phase 1 testing dem-
onstrating safety in humans.
● Pre-launch (PMA) stage: phase II and phase III trials
demonstrating efficacy and ultimately effectiveness under
tightly controlled circumstances.
Regulatory structure. Determination of the class of
technology is critical to the time to market launch. Full anal-
ysis of predicate technologies will reveal whether the technol-
ogy in question can be categorized either class I, II, or III
(ranging from benign, harmless devices through implantable
devices for which demonstrated safety and effectiveness must
be statistically proven before market release). Subsequent sub-
mission of either the shorter pathway of a 510 (k) appropriate
device or a lengthy and costly PMA application demanding a
randomized trial with sufficient statistical power, will have a
significant influence on the type of investor sought and the
ultimate terms of the financing.
Current standards of care. A thorough analysis of
existing current therapies must be undertaken to determine
whether the developing technology truly offers anything in
a quality/cost/unmet need paradigm. This analysis entails
review of:
● Efficacy and effectiveness of current interventional and
noninterventional approaches to the disease, as published
in reports of appropriate randomized studies or meta-
analysis of high-level reviews of similar parameters. In the
absence of such data, review of anecdotal literature may
be undertaken with the caveat that current therapies may
reflect long-standing clinical assumptions rather than
demonstrated effectiveness, or that efficacy in tertiary
centers may not have diffused sufficiently to prove effec-
tiveness in the hands of the noninvestigative provider.
● Risk-benefit ratio for current therapies and a complete
audit of complications, morbidity, and mortality associ-
ated with these current therapies must be established.
● Ease-of-use, learning curve, quality of life, discomfort
level, required ancillary services for existing therapies and
comparison to the proposed alternatives.
● Alternative therapies (eg, interventions replacing phar-
macological solutions and vice versa).
These parameters will also be tied to the market dynam-
ics: competitors, other projected developments, reimburse-
ment patterns, previous failures in the same field with
attendant analysis thereof, and distribution channels for
competitive technologies.
Manufacturing diligence. Manufacturing standards
must be established for the sites involved in producing the
technology in question. This must include materials test-
ing; appropriate fatigue, deformation, dysfunction, and
breakage expectations based on well-engineered in vitro
stress simulations; as well as sterility, packaging, labelling
and adherence to international manufacturing standards.
Intellectual property. Intellectual property rights are
critical to commercial success in most health-care related
ventures. These rights ensure freedom to operate (not
infringing on others’ patents) and barriers to entry (dis-
abling patents preventing others from competing in the
same filed with similar technological solutions). Attention
to intellectual property positions is an all to frequently
ignored part of an early stage company’s development or is
lost in the rush to publish before the university or technol-
ogy transfer group has appropriately secured its position for
inventors and center of origin.
Management. By the time a biomedical technology
has reached the maturity to attract outside investors, man-
agement of the project should be assumed by experienced
business development. It is a common misconception that
a technology’s intrinsic capability will determine its success
at the bedside. The process of fundraising, overall company
vision, engineering, as well as the core, driving clinical or
scientific competence that initiated the company in the
beginning usually needs to rest with a management team
that is differentiated from the scientific process or has
significant administrative capacity and understanding of
business dynamics. Founder-management combinations
are possible; however, to justify funding, investors look
increasingly to those with a track record in bringing bio-
medical technologies to market. Business judgement, like
surgical judgement, involves recognizing one’s limitations
and seeking synergistic help, collaboration, and expertise to
bring a project to a successful outcome.
SUMMARY
There is no magic to the capital-raising exercise for the
young, technology-rich company. Most of the tenets and
process expressed in this review are common sense. If a com-
pany has a clear vision of its ultimate goal, it will gain access to
capital in form and amounts that will prepare it for that goal.
The astute management team should also be able to avoid the
traps that can stifle growth and ultimately prevent the tech-
nology from reaching the patient’s bedside.
Despite the potential conflict that must be addressed
when clinicians and investigators engage in commercial
pursuits, it must be recognized that the very nature of
medical practice and scientific discovery in our society is
linked to material and personal reward that have long been
tolerated and encouraged in both academic centers and
community settings. Because the goal of all technology
support and development, including the distribution of
government grants, is to allow the fruits of intellectual labor
to improve the lives and care of patients, responsible man-
agement of the process and effective communication
among all responsible parties, rather than the stifling of
entrepreneurship would seem to be a moral imperative on
the part of both scientific founders and their university
settings and the financial community. Understanding the
process by which the goals of technology development are
accomplished is one small part of this overall management.
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